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In their introduction to this symposium, Biesta and Osberg argue that complexity 
theory has pointed to the fundamental unpredictability of the real, and to the ways in 
which educational practices cannot be controlled. This is in line with Freud’s 
comment that education is an impossible profession because it cannot mandate or 
master the future. It also echoes Derrida on undecidability and responsibility. The 
impossible is that which cannot be foreseen prior to its invention, its actual 
emergence. To act responsibly therefore is to accept this incalculability to the future, 
our inability to mandate, and to invent on this basis. To not do so, to subsume one’s 
actions to a rationale of thinking that we do know what will happen in the future, that 
it can be engineered, is to act irresponsibly. Complexity theory then is linked to a 
series of theoretical innovations that suggest a more contingent engagement with the 
world based on impossibility, undecidability and responsibility. This is inscribed in 
the concept of strong emergence (Osberg and Biesta 2007). 
 
Complexity theory is part of that range of framings that look at the relations and 
interactions and networks as crucial to emergence. The more links, the more recursive 
the system, the more potential there is for indeterminacy. Change will occur but in 
unpredictable ways. Yet we see in education practices that are very predictable at a 
systems level. For instance, attainment is marked by systematic effects of gender, 
class, race. Osberg and Biesta suggest such predictability arises from the work of 
complexity reduction, whereby recursivity and emergence are reduced. Thus a 
predictability at the macro level is built into attainment by students increasingly being 
channelled through standardised forms of assessment, through which the range of 
possible markers of attainment are reduced. 
 
This notion of complexity reduction can be seen to be similar to the notion of black-
boxing in actor-network theory (ANT), wherein actants temporarily lose their 
relational moorings and seem to have an independent existence. While complexity 
reduction may work to increase the predictability of practices, black-boxing enables 
networks to practice as actants. 
 
In Education we are familiar with the desire for predictability and the capacity to 
mandate the future. Governments look to the education research community to 
provide them with evidence to inform policy and practice. However, for educators, 
what is the point of trying to change or improve things if it proves impossible? If 
predictability is increased by complexity reduction, do we not then cut back on the 
possibilities of emergence, for invention? Is there a danger that emergence becomes 
valued and privileged over complexity reduction, when it is through the particular 
configurations of emergence and reduction that the world is ordered? 
 
In this aporia I want to take lifelong learning as a policy example of the attempt to 
mandate the future through complexity reduction. However, I also want to argue that 
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lifelong learning as a concept deconstructs that very possibility by escaping the 
boundaries of the very reductions to which it is subject. 
 
At the heart of much educational policy making in Europe in recent years are attempts 
at mastery of the future, of the knowledge economy and social inclusion, with lifelong 
learning positioned as the means to achieve this. The future is marked by complexity 
and unpredictability inscribed in the various forms of globalisation at play (Edwards 
and Usher 2008). The obligatory passage point for education policy becomes the 
knowledge economy and education in the form of lifelong learning is duly harnessed 
and reduced to service its production. It is through the uptake of lifelong learning to 
support the knowledge economy that the future can be mastered and complexity 
reduced. Here lifelong learning is the service response to global complexity. 
 
Yet this search for mastery has within its margins a lack of mastery. The possibilities 
for lifelong learning in this sense are impossible. For lifelong learning does not 
remedy this lack of mastery, but actually accentuates it further. So the lack of mastery 
creates the conditions for the endlessness of lifelong learning. Thus, rather than being 
a solution to the problem of change and uncertainty – a condition for mastery – 
lifelong  learning can be therefore understood differently – as actually fuelling the 
uncertainty to which it is the supposed response. Rather than a route to mastery, 
lifelong learning might be better considered a condition of constant apprenticeship 
(Rikowski 1999) or emergence. This occurs because learning as a lifelong and 
lifewide phenomenon is a set of uncontrolable relations, which can neither be reduced 
nor black-boxed. It is therefore as much a contributor to global complexity in addition 
to being a reductive response to it. 
 
Lifelong learning as a policy goal therefore deconstructs the mastery through which it 
is so often invoked. It is in educational terms an expression of the impossibility of 
mastery, of mandating the future, even as it is invoked as the basis for continuing to 
master. Lifelong learning is symptomatic of the impossibility of education. Its 
complexity – what some refer to as its conceptual slipperiness – cannot be reduced to 
the service of the knowledge economy nor social inclusion. There is a constant play of 
emergence and invention, a play of disordering in the ordering of education.  
 
These ideas signify notions that are a far cry from any certainty about the teleological 
goals of education and how they are to be achieved. They are based upon processes of 
constant invention and renewal rather than ultimate purposes as ends. This may or 
may not be positioned as another reduction. And perhaps this is as it needs to be. In 
his critique of critical pedagogy’s desire for a language of possibility – which itself 
often attempts certain reductions of possibility - Biesta (1998) extends this idea of the 
impossibility of mandating the future to all human interactions and suggests, drawing 
on Derrida and Foucault that practices need to be developed around an ‘emancipatory 
ignorance’. Here  
 
It just is an ignorance that does not claim to know how the future will be or will 
have to be. It is an ignorance that does not show the way, but only issues an 
invitation to set out on the journey. It is an ignorance that does not say what to 
think of it, but only asks, ‘What do you think about it?’ In short it is an 
ignorance that makes room for the possibility of disclosure. (Biesta 1998: 505). 
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Biesta’s argument is related specifically to critical pedagogy, but it is relevant to the 
reformulation of a discourse of education more generally. This is a pedagogy of 
invention (Osberg and Biesta 2007). 
 
Formulating an educational discourse around apprenticeship, impossibility and 
ignorance may seem absurd in these performative times. When outcomes and outputs 
are to the fore, what spaces are there for educational discourses around emergence? 
But it is here that I find the concepts of fallibility and conditionality in addition to 
impossibility helpful. Fallibility because it points to the notion that, even if we 
practice upon the basis of the best available evidence we have, we know full well it is 
not perfect, that we cannot mandate. This is turn results in and from a position of 
conditionality, that is, we could do something rather than we should do something. 
Our efforts then are only as good as we currently can establish and they are a process 
of invention, emergence and reduction, rather than any exercise in mandating and 
mastery. The normative basis for what we do becomes a more cautiously creative 
affair, something which I know to be unattractive to many educators who feel the 
normative potential of education to transform people and societies is unrealised. 
Fallibility and conditionality provide a basis for invention, for creativity and 
experimentation in educational practices, based upon impossible possibilities. 
However, for this to be other than an ‘anything goes’ approach to education, we now 
need to address the question of responsibility.  
 
Here, as a stimulus to further this debate, I want to suggest that there is something for 
the education community to be learned from Weber’s classic studies of the ethos of 
bureaucracy and the more recent work by du Gay (2008, forthcoming) on the ethos of 
responsibility in bureaucratic work. In educational circles bureaucracy, like 
management, is often positioned as antithetical to the committed pedagogic work of 
educators. It can also be seen as a form of complexity reduction in a rather simplistic 
sense of the term. However, if we look at the work of du Gay, it is precisely 
enthusiastic commitments that can be problematic. Du Gay is examining particularly 
the contemporary shift in the ethos of the UK civil service, but one also sees it in the 
wider literature on leadership and management. Here Weberian bureaucracy is 
positioned as getting in the way of enterprise. It becomes central to success for the 
heart to be on the sleeve in what one does at work, as long of course as this is in line 
with organisational strategy. A committed and enthusiastic workforce is the goal. This 
produces partisanship and is usually based upon a view of the future to be mandated. 
This may have come from the political right, but is far from being confined to it. 
 
In discussions of public sector performance… governments of many different 
political hues have come to the conclusion that Weberian bureaucracy is not a 
solution but rather a barrier to ‘delivery’.  In their search for responsive, 
entrepreneurial forms of public management, party-political governments rail 
against the obstruction and inertia of conservative bureaucrats, and seek instead 
to surround themselves with enthusiastic, committed champions of  their 
policies. (Du Gay 2008, forthcoming) 
 
The ethic of responsibility in Weber takes a different form. For Weber, it is precisely 
the capacity to work ‘without affection or enthusiasm, and without anger or prejudice’ 
that is critical to the work to be undertaken by public officials within modern 
democracies. In other words, complexity reduction may be a necessary feature of the 
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ordering of associations for the social to be possible at all. It may therefore be 
responsible for us to decrease recusivity in certain circumstances, to try and make the 
impossible possible, at least for the moment. This view seems to me more consistent 
with the view that mandating the future is impossible but also relies precisely on the 
forms of conditionality and fallibility I have been outlining. It positions complexity 
reduction to be important and valuable in making things happen, even if it is also 
subject to the invention of emergence. 
 
I am not arguing that educators are or should be considered simply as part of the state 
bureaucracy. What I am suggesting is that the ethos of responsibility that Weber 
argued to be central to the good working of governing may well have something 
analogous to tell us in a period in which enthusiasm and commitment is being 
promulgated as significant attributes to be developed in and through leadership. It 
might be said that leadership in this sense only adds to the hiatus and sense of crisis 
we face. But this may involve attempting the impossible, by trying to work against 
emergence. Whether such is possible in these performative times is another matter.  
 
What I am suggesting here then, is that it is not about invoking either possibility or 
impossibility, emergence or reduction, invention or performativity, but about trying to 
formulate ethical orderings within which there is an inherent play of 
(un)predictability. For me, however unsatisfactory, the concept of lifelong learning 
symbolises an educational expression of this condition. 
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